"I am too old and gnarled to plant. I will try to work the land, but it will be hard."

- Maria I., 54, widow and grandmother, Luau, 
Most of the major postwar population movement in Angola is now complete. Except for an estimated 53,000 Angolan refugees living in camps in bordering countries, almost all Angolans displaced during the war appear to have found permanent homes. Since the end of 2004, the government and the UN have determined that there are no longer any Angolans who remain internally displaced, because those who have not returned to their places of origin have chosen to remain in their areas of resettlement permanently, often due to greater financial opportunities in urban centers.74 Human Rights Watch did not interview anyone whose personal experience contradicted this assessment.

Aside from investigating the voluntary repatriation of refugees, Human Rights Watch focused its investigation on the lives of all returnees-including those who had been internally displaced, refugees and former combatants-when they resettle in their final destinations. These returnees share most of the same problems when they come home, particularly the lack of such basic social services as health care and education, and pervasive unemployment. The country's shattered infrastructure and massive mine contamination have isolated many returnee communities and put pressure on desirable land near towns where social services and non-agricultural jobs are concentrated. Some groups, such as the disabled, elderly and female-headed households, are especially vulnerable to this lack of social assistance. Demobilized soldiers are still waiting for the vocational training promised to them in the Luena MOU. 

Food Assistance
Recent cutbacks to food distribution have rendered the reintegration of recent returnees and their transition to productive agricultural cultivation more difficult. The original 2004 plan of the World Food Programme (WFP) for food assistance involved distributing two months' rations at the reception centers and then registering returnees for food aid for two growing seasons when they returned to their final destinations. This assistance was intended to give returnees time to cultivate their land, which generally requires at least two growing seasons (about one year) to produce enough food to feed a family. Reduced international funding to WFP, however, has forced it to cut cereal rations by 50 percent since 2004, limit food assistance to only one growing season and reduce the school feeding program that assists thousands of children when they return to their communities.75 In addition, an Angolan law banning the import and use of genetically modified foods has recently come into effect, which has caused the WFP to worry that donor contributions will be reduced even further.76 

To be fair, diminishing demand as well as supply has led the WFP to decrease the number of beneficiaries, thanks to decreased vulnerability and improved food production.77 This means that only the people most vulnerable to food insecurity, such as the most recent returnees (who have had the least time to cultivate their land), the elderly, the disabled and female-headed households, are still receiving food assistance, and they consequently bear the brunt of funding cutbacks. In December 2004, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that 717,000 returnees and other vulnerable people still needed food assistance notwithstanding the improved harvests in 2004.78

The highest proportion of food-insecure people is located in Huambo, Bié and parts of Huíla provinces in the central highlands, and in Moxico and Cuando Cubango in the southeast. Most of these regions are heavily populated by returnees affiliated with UNITA. In the central highlands, unusually severe rains and winds in 2004 caused extensive crop damage, and 75 percent of the communities in the region reported smaller harvests than in the previous year. In Moxico and Cuando Cubango, remoteness is the main obstacle to food security, and access to these isolated areas becomes considerably more difficult or even impossible during the rainy season, which corresponds to the period of greatest food shortages in Angola. Indeed, 110,000 people-65 percent of them food-insecure-were inaccessible to the humanitarian community during most of the 2004 rainy season.79 The central highlands and Moxico are major areas of return for refugees, former IDPs and ex-combatants, who constitute a large proportion of the food-insecure population. Unfortunately, donors are also cutting funds to WFP's air service, which is sometimes the only way to access some isolated communities. Communities without airstrips or roads to larger communities are completely stranded.

Human Rights Watch interviewed a number of representatives from donor countries who revealed their unwillingness or reluctance to continue funding food aid, which they perceive to be unsustainable.80 Donors are also frustrated by the government of Angola's inability-or perceived unwillingness81-to feed its own people despite earning windfall oil revenues in 2004 from rocketing oil prices.82 As one donor embassy official told Human Rights Watch, "The days of the free rations off the back of the truck are over."83 
Poor nutrition for returnees today will have long-term repercussions for their prospects for reintegration. The 50 percent cereal rations have caused families who have resettled but not completed at least one agricultural cycle to devote an important part of their time to the immediate search for food instead of preparing for the coming year's harvest, which exposes them to continued food insecurity in the future.84 Inadequate nutrition also leaves people more vulnerable to debilitating diseases, such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. In the province of Malanje, for example, the central hospital identified thirty-three new cases of tuberculosis between August and October 2004, which the Ministry of Health associated with the lack of food and HIV/AIDS infections.85

Access to Land 
For returnees to rural areas, long-term food security depends on access to land for cultivation. The Norms require the government to ensure access to safe and suitable land and work with local communities and NGOs to identify and distribute agricultural land with secure access to the nearest market and sufficient space to construct dwellings.86 In reality, returnees acquire land through different methods, depending on location and community traditions. In Moxico province, families generally return to their areas of origin and approach the local soba to request a parcel of land.87 Because only three percent of the population has documentation of land ownership, rights to land are guaranteed by the oral testimony of witnesses, including the soba, who can attest to land rights of particular individuals or families in cases of conflict.88 The local administration recognizes the traditional authority of the soba to allocate land.89 
In Huambo, where Human Rights Watch found no community land under the control of the soba, returnees rely on their families for access to land.90 In many areas of the country, including Huambo, whole villages were abandoned during the war and consequently the entire local population is comprised of people who have recently returned to their places of origin. As a result, most of the people interviewed by Human Rights Watch were able to return to their family's land with minimal or no conflict among neighbors.91 Many returnees, however, lack sufficient land for farming. The average former combatant, for example, has acquired about 0.7 hectare of land, but most families generally require at least two hectares for subsistence farming.92 Adequate and secure land tenure is crucial to the reintegration of former combatants. As a donor government representative involved in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process told Human Rights Watch, "Unless ex-combatants have the real land title, they won't really be integrated. As soon as they have access to land, they feel included in civil life and society."93 In addition to these challenges, families are able to cultivate only a fraction of the land they occupy because they lack animal traction, such as oxen, to clear overgrown land and work larger areas.94

Although disputes among families are rare, Huambo province has been the site of clashes between would-be commercial operators and local communities. The predominant form of officially recognized land ownership in the central highlands, known as the "breadbasket of Angola," is based on the colonial-era concession system, comprised largely of fazendas (large agricultural estates or plantations). Because nearly all returnees lack formal title to the land they occupy, the rise of former and new fazendas threatens to displace people who have been cultivating this land since the war.95 In a small village on the outskirts of Caala, for example, the local authorities permitted a Brazilian coffee producer to take over several thousand hectares for cultivation, without consulting the local community. When the company arrived in March 2004, it demarcated an area encroaching upon land occupied by local residents. A group of local men confronted the Brazilians with arms and machetes, but a local NGO, ADRA-Angola, intervened to mediate the dispute, and the local farmers' association took the case to court with the help of MÃos Livres, an Angolan legal assistance NGO. The coffee producer has abandoned its plans in the village while the case goes through the court system.96 

The virtual absence of any provincial justice system, however, makes recourse to the courts difficult for most communities. There is a risk that similar land conflicts could increase if the government passes a new land bill, currently under consideration by the National Assembly. The proposed Land Law would give the government authority to appropriate land from families and individuals who do not have formal title-in other words, the vast majority of Angolans, including almost all returnees. The law would give Angolans one year to regularize their papers and acquire official title to the land they occupy, an unrealistic timetable in a country with a shattered legal system, no accurate or updated land registry and poor access to information among rural citizens.97 The lack of safe roads and public transport makes it difficult for impoverished farmers to travel to provincial centers to lodge their land claims. 

Unless the new law includes provisions to protect the rights of informal and traditional landholders-or at least guarantee community consultation in developing land use plans-social conflict could occur between residents and elites, such as military officers and government officials, who are given title to large concessions regardless of whether the land is already occupied. New land legislation should also be accompanied by institutional changes to give residents recourse in cases of land appropriation, and by a public education campaign to inform citizens of the consequences of the new land law and to teach them how to protect their rights.98

Special Needs of Vulnerable Groups
In Article 2 of the Norms, the government of Angola tasked its provincial administrations with "giving particular attention to the most vulnerable (widows, children, elderly, disabled) that may require special assistance." In addition, ExCom Conclusion 101 (LV) of 2004 recommends that "in consultation with refugee communities consideration be given to addressing the specific needs of returning refugees-including women, children, older people and other persons with special concerns-in order to ensure that they receive adequate protection, assistance and care throughout the repatriation and initial reintegration process."99 Yet Human Rights Watch found no evidence of any government assistance to these vulnerable persons when they reach their final destinations. Instead, they rely upon the support of their families and neighbors in communities where resources are already stretched thin, and on international NGOs that are in the process of closing their operations in many areas of return. 

Female-headed households and women living alone face special problems in accessing and cultivating land. Although Human Rights Watch interviewed women heads of family who cultivated their own land,100 in some communities, tradition does not allow women to own land, despite the fact that Angolan law permits it. Unless women have enough children to help them farm, subsistence agriculture without substantial inputs, including fertilizer and oxen, is nearly impossible.101 One widow who recently returned from DRC with her young grandson after his mother died of AIDS felt anxious about her ability to feed herself and the boy. "I am too old and gnarled to plant," she told Human Rights Watch. "I will try to work the land, but it will be hard."102
Another elderly widow told Human Rights Watch that she relies upon the soba of her village for food and assistance. She returned from DRC to Luau in October 2004, hoping to reunite with her family. "I expected to meet my family here when I returned, and I thought they would take care of me-I didn't know that they had all died," she said. The soba offered her land to cultivate, but because of the distance and the lack of anyone to help her farm it, she relies on food assistance provided by the soba, who encourages members of the community to share extra food with her and other "vulnerables," as they are known.

Some international NGOs help the elderly, disabled and female-headed households construct houses when they return home, and provide micro-credit and other forms of agricultural support. The NGOs register these individuals when they arrive in the reception centers and help to arrange for de-mining if necessary. But their assistance is not permanent, and there is no social safety net to catch their beneficiaries when they leave. In November and December 2004, for example, Save the Children-US closed its operations in Cazombo and Luau. One Save the Children representative told Human Rights Watch, "I don't think anyone will keep helping the vulnerable people when we leave. But these people will survive somehow."103 

The government's responsibility to assist is not limited to vulnerable groups. The Regulamento gives the government detailed responsibilities for providing social assistance and rehabilitating infrastructure. For example, the provincial administration must build or rehabilitate health posts for any resettlement sites with a population of more than 5,000, or provide mobile medical assistance for locations with smaller populations. The government must provide returnees with access to potable water, with at least one water pump for every 600 people, and also rehabilitate schools and guarantee that children are able to attend schools without paying fees or being required to purchase uniforms.104 Moreover, the Norms and Regulamento mandate continuous monitoring and reassessment of the return process, with a focus on such indicators as the birth registration database and the issuance of identification cards; the functioning of health, education, and water and sanitation services; the identification and allocation of agricultural land; and food assistance.105

Reintegration of Former UNITA Combatants
The Luena MOU anticipated the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of 50,000 UNITA troops,106 although the actual scope of the demobilization far surpassed initial estimates-approximately 100,000 UNITA troops and more than 280,000 dependents eventually passed through the quartering areas.107 The government also agreed to demobilize 33,000 FAA troops, a process that has yet to be completed. In the Luena MOU, the government committed itself to reintegrating former UNITA combatants into civilian life:
The Government . with UNITA participation and with the assistance of the international community, shall proceed with the reintegration of the demobilized personnel into civil society, within a program of vocational reintegration. The vocational reinsertion of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces includes . the professional training of the personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces, to prepare them for the national labor market, through a program of special and urgent social reintegration.108 

More than two years later, this critical phase of the reintegration process has only just begun on a large scale, in the form of the World Bank-financed Angolan Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP), which is part of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in effect since 2002. The World Bank is funding the ADRP to the tune of U.S. $33 million and the government of Angola administers the program through the Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (Instituto de ReintegraçÃo Sócio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares, IRSEM). According to government figures, approximately 25,000 former UNITA combatants were involved in IRSEM-ADRP projects by the end of 2004, and an additional 10,000 were expected to participate by March 2005.109 These projects include agricultural support, community works projects, vocational training and the promotion of income-generating activities.110 Yet IRSEM's capacity at the national, local and provincial levels is still limited. The United Nations Development Programme has provided technical assistance to IRSEM, which is also accepting bids from potential partner organizations in the implementation of the ADRP.111

The majority of former soldiers interviewed by Human Rights Watch had not received any form of vocational training or agricultural assistance beyond the seeds and tools distributed in the quartering areas in 2002.112 One group of former UNITA combatants in Chicala Cholohanga (also known as Vila Nova), still devastated from street-to-street fighting in the final stages of the war, explained the frustration they felt in trying to start new lives as civilians. They reported that of the approximately 3,000 former soldiers living in Chicala Cholohanga, more than half had not received any assistance - not even the five months' salary and $100 reintegration allowance they should have received in the quartering area, let alone vocational training:113 

When we were in the quartering area, we were led to believe that conditions would be different, that we would receive professional training. But actually, the government has not lived up to its promises.114

Another former UNITA soldier described his hopes for the future:
During the war, many of us lost our ability to go to school. We would like academic training. We are farmers and would like to work on the land, but we lack the right conditions - we need a plow, fertilizer, and oxen. We could also become carpenters, masons, electricians and painters, even drivers. We just want to take care of our families and give our children a better life.115
In addition to creating this sense of frustration among former soldiers, delays in the implementation of the ADRP may have increased the risk of conflict between former combatants and their neighbors. Selectively assisting former combatants may foster resentment among people who feel unfairly "left out" of the program. Former combatants must also cling to their military identities to be entitled to benefits, further hindering their social and psychological reintegration. The World Bank acknowledged these risks in planning the ADRP, and is emphasizing community-based programs to enable former combatants to work with their neighbors on projects benefiting the entire community, such as the construction of schools, health posts, small roads, bridges and water supply and sanitation systems.116 As well as assisting the ex-combatants, the World Bank has stated that it hopes such projects will promote reconciliation. Angola, of course, is a place where hopes have been too often dashed. The World Bank, IRSEM and its partner organization must be vigilant to potential conflicts, including the risk of political manipulation of aid to ex-UNITA soldiers and associates, by ensuring adequate monitoring of ADRP implementation. 
In Struggling Through Peace: Return and Resettlement in Angola, Human Rights Watch expressed concern that the DDR process excluded women, including the wives and widows of former UNITA combatants, women abandoned by UNITA combatants, and women and girls abducted during the war and forced to join UNITA forces as "wives," porters or in other support functions.117 These women are still suffering the social and psychological effects of the war. One government official told Human Rights Watch of his fear of stigmatizing underage ex-combatants and women and girls who were exploited during the war. He described plans to work with child protection NGOs to provide trauma counseling and life skills training to rehabilitate and reintegrate women and girls who were raped and sexually abused during the war.118 

Human Rights Watch also reported on the exclusion of underage ex-combatants during the demobilization process in Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers in Angola (2003). The ADRP attempts to address these problems by mandating that each reintegration project include a "social component" to assist women, children and the disabled, either directly or through community-based projects. In Caala, for example, the ADRP is funding a business training and micro-finance project for 400 widows and female ex-combatants.119

The World Bank and IRSEM plan to work with a number of NGOs, including Christian Children's Fund, Save the Children-UK and church groups, in assisting these vulnerable groups in the reintegration of former underage combatants by providing family tracing and reunification services, trauma counseling and psychosocial care, educational and recreational activities, and vocational training for children over 15 years of age.120 UNICEF also has played a leading role in family tracing and reunification efforts since the Luena MOU, which established tracing centers in UNITA quartering areas. Because the ADRP is still in its initial stages, Human Rights Watch was unable to observe the activities targeting women, children and the disabled, but welcomes the acknowledgment of the need to include them in the reintegration process. Now the government and international community must guarantee that the recognition of these challenges translates into action. 

Transition from Emergency to Development Assistance
Angola is facing a challenge common to postwar societies-the transition from emergency and humanitarian aid to longer-term development assistance from the international community. OCHA has been designated the Transitional Coordination Unit and coordinates with UNDP in an effort to avoid an abrupt and premature cut-off of humanitarian assistance, as well as build the capacity of national institutions to coordinate assistance activities. 

International donors, however, have yet to develop a mechanism to ensure a smooth transition period. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), for example, will soon close its office in Angola and has cut most of its humanitarian funding, which generally goes to food assistance, health care and other immediate needs. But Angola continues to suffer a "structural emergency" regarding infrastructure and social services.121 Even with adequate financial resources-which have not been forthcoming from the government-the human resources are not yet in place to guarantee adequate health care, education and other services. 

The government's financial practices only exacerbate this problem by delaying the advent of development and reconstruction funding, which is generally required on a greater scale than humanitarian aid. Donors are understandably reluctant to finance large infrastructure and long-term development projects for a government that is already earning massive oil revenues with notoriously poor standards of accountability and transparency.122 They fear development projects will become slush funds for government and financial elites. In interviews with Human Rights Watch, several donors and NGOs cited the example of other African countries, which devote a larger portion of their national income to social spending despite possessing far fewer resources and even more external debt. 

One of the first steps in formulating a long-term development strategy is adopting a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which the World Bank must approve before making loans available for development activities.123 In a heartening show of public participation, local NGOs held workshops in several provinces to draft recommendations for the PRSP. The government, unfortunately, ignored their efforts and submitted a PRSP without the input of civil society. The World Bank's Board of Directors has not yet approved the PRSP.124 

President Dos Santos recently rejected the International Monetary Fund's demands for progress in macroeconomic stability, transparency and monitoring of public expenditures. In a speech to the MPLA, the president accused the IMF of placing unreasonable conditions on holding a donors' conference and vowed that Angola would rely on other sources of cash-including "bilateral cooperation and national and foreign private investment"-to fund national reconstruction.125 Indeed, the Angolan government is already using a $2 billion oil-backed credit line from China to fund high-profile public works projects.126 Critics fear that this loan and similar forms of bilateral assistance tied to Angola's oil resources will enable the government to escape scrutiny and much-needed economic reforms, resulting in continued corruption and the grossly inadequate allocation of resources to sustainable social spending.127 Unless the government provides more funds to meet its responsibilities in the reintegration process, returnees and their fellow citizens will be caught in the emergency-to-development gap and see their standard of living deteriorate as international humanitarian assistance dries up. 

________________________________________
[74] Philippe Lazzarini, OCHA/TCU, Representative, Luanda, November 10, 2004. Human Rights Watch has determined that approximately 20,000 Angolans remain displaced in Cabinda due to fighting there between separatist forces and the government. For a description of the human rights situation in Cabinda, see Human Rights Watch, Angola: Between War and Peace in Cabinda (New York: December 2004).
[75] According to a recent WFP situation report, "the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation continues to be severely under-funded. There has been a precipitous drop in contributions from major donors since the start of 2004 compared to previous years. The Project still needs about USD $77 million to complete through the end of 2005, even with reduced beneficiary levels and a much smaller school-feeding program than had initially been envisaged." WFP-Angola Situation Report No. 20/04, October 2004.
[76] IRIN News, "Angola: GM food ban comes into effect, sparks WFP concern," January 25, 2005, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45217&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA. 
[77] The organization's initial assistance target for the latter half of 2004 was 1.49 million people, which was reduced to 1.1 million after a vulnerability assessment showed a decline in the number of food insecure people compared to 2003. World Food Program, Information Note on Angola Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 10054.2 (Rome: October 11-14, 2004).
[78] Food and Agriculture Organization, Food Supply Situation and Crop Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa, No. 3, December 2004.
[79] World Food Program, Information Note on Angola Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 10054.2 (Rome: October 11-14, 2004). A humanitarian worker in Lumbala N'Guimbo, the site of a reception center, said she feared the repatriation process was creating an "island" because the town is accessible only by air, which makes aid delivery to the returnees' final destinations very difficult and impossible during the rainy season. Human Rights Watch interview with NGO officer, Luanda, November 18, 2004. 
[80] Human Rights Watch interview with Nicole Maes, Second Secretary, Dutch Embassy, Luanda, November 12, 2004.
[81] In December 2004, the government of Angola finally agreed to release $4 million of the $7 million it had promised to contribute for WFP operations in 2004-2005. IRIN News, "Angola: Government releases $4 million for food aid operations," December 17, 2004, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=44694. 
[82] One donor representative expressed consternation that a country with Angola's wealth in natural resources was still asking for money to purchase such basic items as seeds and tools. Human Rights Watch interview with donor official, Luanda, November 17, 2004.
[83] Human Rights Watch interview with donor embassy official, Luanda, November 19, 2004.
[84] World Food Program, Information Note on Angola Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 10054.2 (Rome: October 11-14, 2004).
[85] WFP-Angola Situation Report No. 20/04, October 2004. 
[86] Article 3 (Identification of Land), Council of Ministers Decree No. 1/01, adopted January 5, 2001. See also Article 14 (Identification and Allocation of Land), Council of Ministers Decree No. 79/02 (Regulation for the Application of the Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations), December 6, 2002.
[87] Human Rights Watch interviews with recently returned refugees and IDPs, Luau and Cazombo, November 22-25, 2004.
[88] Development Workshop, Land and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Huambo Province in Postwar Angola, draft research report presented to World Bank Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project and Foreign Affairs Canada-Human Security Program (Luanda: May 2004).
[89] Human Rights Watch interview with Nhakatolo Chilombo, Paramount Soba of Moxico province, Cazombo, November 25, 2004.
[90] Human Rights Watch interviews with recently returned refugees, IDPs and former combatants in Huambo province, November 26-30, 2004; Human Rights Watch interviews with Helder Marcelino, ADRA-Angola (Association for Rural Development and the Environment) and Cupi Baptista, Vozes de Paz (Voices of Peace), Huambo city, November 26, 2004.
[91] Human Rights Watch interview with Helder Marcelino, ADRA (Association for Rural Development and the Environment), Huambo city, November 26, 2004, and Human Rights Watch interview with Allan Cain, Director of Development Workshop, Luanda, November 15, 2004.
[92] Human Rights Watch interview with Allan Cain, Director of Development Workshop, Luanda, November 15, 2004. A recent survey found that the higher the quantity of land to which ex-combatants have access, the more likely they are to feel reintegrated into civilian life. World Bank Angola Country Office, "Brief Overview - From Soldiers to Citizens: A study of the social, economic and political reintegration of UNITA ex-combatants in post-war Angola," October 11, 2004.
[93] Human Rights Watch interview with representative of governmental development agency, Luanda, November 17, 2004.
[94] Human Rights Watch interviews with recently returned refugees, IDPs and former combatants in Huambo province, November 26-30, 2004; Development Workshop, Land and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Huambo Province in Postwar Angola, draft research report presented to World Bank Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project and Foreign Affairs Canada-Human Security Program (Luanda: May 2004).
[95] Human Rights Watch interview with Allan Cain, Director of Development Workshop, Luanda, November 15, 2004, and Development Workshop, Land and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Huambo Province in Postwar Angola, draft research report presented to World Bank Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project and Foreign Affairs Canada-Human Security Program (Luanda: May 2004).
[96] Human Rights Watch interview with Helder Marcelino, ADRA (Association for Rural Development and the Environment), Huambo city, November 26, 2004, and Development Workshop Update, "The new land law-will it protect rural communities?" (Luanda: May-July 2004). 
[97] IRIN, "Angola: Parliament to Vote on Crucial Land Bill," August 9, 2004.
[98] Development Workshop, Terra Firme (research report) (Luanda: October 2003).
[99] ExCom Conclusion 101 (LV) of 2004, para. (p).
[100] Human Rights Watch interview with Angela T., Caala municipality, Huambo province, November 27, 2004. Angela T., forty-four, returned to her village in 2001 after three years of internal displacement. Three of her eight children assist her in farming the family's two hectares, which were very difficult to clear after having lain fallow for three years. World Vision provided her fertilizer through a micro-credit program, which significantly improved her crop yield. "The food goes up and down, but it's generally enough. It would be more stable if we had more fertilizer," she told Human Rights Watch. 
[101] Development Workshop, Land and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Huambo Province in Postwar Angola, draft research report presented to World Bank Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project and Foreign Affairs Canada-Human Security Program (Luanda: May 2004).
[102] Human Rights Watch interview with Maria I., 54, Luau reception center, November 22, 2004
[103] Human Rights Watch interview with Domingo Luis Antonio, Operating Officer, Save the Children-US, Luau, November 24, 2004. In 2004, Save the Children registered more than 5,000 individuals for assistance at the Luau Reception Center, and 2,550 in 2003.
[104] Article 16 (Rehabilitation of Infrastructure), Article 17 (Water and Sanitation) and Article 18 (Social Assistance), Council of Ministers Decree No. 79/02, December 6, 2002.
[105] Article 2 (Competences of Provincial Governments), Council of Ministers Decree No. 1/01, January 5, 2001, and Article 20 (Assessment), Council of Ministers Decree No. 79/02, December 6, 2002.
[106] Annex I (Document Relating to the Quartering of UNITA Military Forces), Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues Under the Lusaka Protocol, Luena, April 4, 2002.
[107] National Commission for the Social and Productive Reintegration of the Demobilized and Displaced (ComissÃo Nacional para a ReintegraçÃo Social e Produtiva dos Desmobilizados e Deslocados, CNRSPDD) and Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (Instituto de ReintegraçÃo Sócio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares, IRSEM), Implementation Manual of the General Demobilization and Reintegration Program (Luanda: January 2004). For a discussion of the difficulties encountered in the quartering process, see Struggling Through Peace: Return and Resettlement in Angola, pp. 21-26 (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 2003).
[108] Chapter II(E) (Demobilization of the personnel of the UNITA military forces and the extinction of the UNITA military forces), Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues Under the Lusaka Protocol, Luena, April 4, 2002. In the Luena MOU, the government of Angola agreed to provide demobilized soldiers with demobilization and identity cards, five months' salary, $100 for travel expenses and resettlement kits. Human Rights Watch found that government compliance with these obligations varied widely. Some resettled former soldiers reported received all of these benefits, some received none, and others received only partial benefits. Human Rights Watch interviews with former soldiers in Huambo province, November 27-30, 2004.
[109] Human Rights Watch interview with Jose Pinotes, Advisor to IRSEM, Luanda, November 19, 2004. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) also distributed approximately 45,000 seed kits in 2004, and UNDP has provided capacity-building to IRSEM and implemented a few economic reintegration projects. Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives of FAO and UNDP, Luanda, November 5, 2004. 
[110] World Bank, Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program - Technical Annex, March 7, 2003.
[111] Human Rights Watch interview with UNDP official, Luanda, November 5, 2004.
[112] According to UNITA estimates, only 500 of approximately 24,000 former combatants in Huambo province are receiving vocational training. Human Rights Watch interview with Alda Juliana Paulo Sachiambo, UNITA Provincial Secretary, Huambo city, November 29, 2004. Although Human Rights Watch's interviews with former combatants were focused on Huambo and Moxico provinces, international agencies expressed concern that ex-combatants in urban areas were also being neglected. Human Rights Watch interviews with UNDP and FAO, Luanda, November 5, 2004.
[113] Human Rights Watch interview with group of former UNITA combatants, Chicala Cholohanga, Huambo province, November 30, 2004.
[114] Human Rights Watch interview with Lino Z., Chicala Cholohanga, Huambo province, November 30, 2004.
[115] Human Rights Watch interview with Antonio C., Chicala Cholohanga, Huambo province, November 30, 2004. In October 2004, the World Bank sent a delegation to Angola to study the progress being made in implementing the ADRP. The head of the delegation, Sean Bradley, acknowledged that much work remained to be done, but emphasized the logistical difficulties of working in postwar Angola: "In a war-torn country or in a post-conflict setting, you do not just snap your fingers and have assistance programs, vocational training, agricultural support or micro-credit up and going in regions that were until recently inaccessible." IRIN News, "Angola: More needs to done for reintegration of former soldiers," October 29, 2004. 
[116] World Bank, Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program - Technical Annex, para. 21, 91, 92, March 7, 2003 ("Economic reintegration assistance should seek to link ex-combatants with broader, community-based economic recovery and rehabilitation efforts, and should seek to avoid actions that would be perceived as privileging ex-combatants in comparison with other war-affected populations.") 
[117] See Struggling Through Peace: Return and Resettlement in Angola, pp. 23-25 (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 2003).
[118] Human Rights Watch interview with high-ranking government official, Luanda, November 18, 2004.
[119] Human Rights Watch interview with Jose Pinotes, Advisor to IRSEM, Luanda, November 19, 2004.
[120] World Bank, Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program - Technical Annex, para. 112, March 7, 2003.
[121] Human Rights Watch interview with Philippe Lazzarini, Representative, OCHA/TCU, Luanda, November 10, 2004.
[122] For a comprehensive analysis of the Angolan government's gross mismanagement of oil revenues and poor record of social spending, see Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil Revenue in Angola and Its Impact on Human Rights (New York: Human Rights Watch, January 2004).
[123] The 2004 Consolidated Appeal for Transition was the last UN funding appeal to address humanitarian needs. The UN agencies have drafted a UN Development Assistance Framework and a humanitarian strategy for 2005, but these are planning documents intended to set priorities and suggest responses, not seek international funds.
[124] Human Rights Watch interview with representative of the Forum for Non-Governmental Organizations in Angola (FONGA), Luanda, November 13, 2004. 
[125] IRIN News, "Angola: Deciding to go it alone," February 18, 2005, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45652&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA. 
[126] IRIN News, "Angola: Oil-backed loan will finance recovery projects," February 21, 2005, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45688&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA. 
[127] IRIN News, "Angola: Oil-backed loan will finance recovery projects," February 21, 2005, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45688&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA.